Os tambores de guerra já rufam há algum tempo. Agora, o seu som tornou-se mais nítido com a indicação de que o relatório - que ainda irá ser publicado - supostamente provará que o Irão estará no limiar do "estatuto" de potência nuclear. Recordo-me entretanto do Iraque, dos "relatórios" e das "provas" que justificaram uma horrível guerra sem qualquer sentido que está muito longe de ter terminado. Recordo-me que o Paquistão é um autêntico "barril de pólvora nuclear" e pergunto-me quantos candidatos a mártires surgirão por cada dano humano "colateral" que os drones vêm causando. Pergunto-me qual a dimensão do exército de mártires que se formará se o Irão for atacado preventivamente.
It is unfortunate that an analytic frenzy has begun over a report that has not yet been published. It is impossible to analyze the contents of the IAEA report on Iran until we can read it.
Even absent the document itself, however, two points bear repeating. First, even if the cultivated panic surrounding the report’s release is well founded, the suggestion that a military strike against suspected nuclear weapons sites in Iran would solve the problem lacks strong support. The net effect of such an action is difficult to judge beforehand. However, military action seems certain to convince the Iranian leadership that the United States and Israel are implacable aggressors. We should also wonder whether purchasing a delay in Iran’s nuclear program would be worth the cost of making its government—and possibly its people—absolutely certain that the only way to stop aggression against it is the acquisition of a nuclear weapon.
Second, while the consequences of military action are uncertain, so too would be the consequences of a nuclear Iran. These consequences would be different for the United States than for Israel. While one hesitates to advise the Israelis on their national security policies, the nature of the relationship between the United States and Israel means that Israeli action would likely implicate the United States. And it is far from clear that the Israeli leadership believes the Obama administration holds any cards that it could play to constrain Israeli behavior. For this reason, Washington may not hold its regional destiny in its own hands.
Justin Logan, Cato