Os chineses inquietam-se

Tentando contrariar administrativamente a pressão (ascendente) sobre o câmbio do renminbi/yuan, resultado do sustentado e colossal superavit da sua balança de transacções correntes e de capital dos últimos vinte anos, a China de há muito que tem vindo a colocar esses excedentes em títulos da dívida pública soberana, nomeadamente dos Estados Unidos.

Ora, o terror em que vive um grande credor é função directa do risco percebido de o devedor entrar em incumprimento (default), pelo que é motivo de grande preocupação para os chineses não o "nevoeiro" do limite de endividamento, mas sim a capacidade de, a prazo, os EUA entrarem em incumprimento. E por incumprimento entende-se não apenas não cumprir os compromissos a horas mas também, situação diria que muito mais provável, a ocorrência de uma desvalorização do dólar que significaria para o credor (a China) prejuízos gigantescos. Nesta última circunstância, os títulos do Tesouro americano revelar-se-iam verdadeiros activos tóxicos.

Neste recente artigo no Financial Times, o autor, antigo membro do comité de política monetária do Banco central da China, expressa bem a sua preocupação (alguns excertos):

The Chinese government has admitted that its foreign-exchange reserves have already exceeded its needs. It has tried various measures to slow down the growth of these reserves and protect the value of its existing stock. This has included demand stimulation, allowing the renminbi to appreciate gradually and creating sovereign wealth funds. It has also promoted reform of international monetary systems and the internationalisation of the renminbi. Sadly, none of these has worked. With large capital inflows and a current account surplus, China’s foreign exchange reserves have continued to rise rapidly.
The trade off: at what point does the cumulative loss probability offset CNY depreciation gains:

These policies failed because they did not address the real cause of the rapid increase in foreign exchange stocks, namely state intervention aimed at controlling the pace of renminbi appreciation. The question is: what losses is China willing to bear in its foreign exchange reserves in order to slow the pace of the renminbi appreciation?

One further factor is that any losses in the financial assets held by China will not be realised until their holders decide to cash out. If the US government continues to pay back its public debt, and China continues to pack its savings into US securities, this game may continue for a very long time. However, the situation is ultimately unsustainable. The longer it continues, the more violent and destructive the final adjustment will be.

If there is any lesson China can draw from the US debt ceiling crisis, it is that it must stop policies that result in further accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. Given that many large developed countries are simply printing money (and the recent rumours are that the US might return to quantitative easing) China must realise that it can no longer invest in the paper assets of the developed world. The People’s Bank of China must stop buying US dollars and allow the renminbi exchange rate to be decided by market forces as soon as possible. China should have done so a long time ago. There should be no more hesitating and dithering. To float the renminbi is not costless. However, its benefits for the Chinese economy will vastly offset those costs, while being favourable to the global economy as well.